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feat(dissertation): wrote checklist background in full
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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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%%%%% SAFETY %%%%%
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%%%%% SAFETY %%%%%
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\section{Safety in Aviation}
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\section{Safety in Aviation}
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\subsection{History}
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\subsection{History}
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@ -25,62 +26,141 @@
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% - Rates of accidents
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% - Rates of accidents
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\begin{itemize}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item 70-80\% of aviation accidents are attributed to human factors~\cite{faa:reasons}
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\item 70-80\% of aviation accidents are attributed to human factors~\cite{faa:reasons}
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\item The first use of a checklist was in 1935 after the crash of a prototype plane known
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back then as the Model 299 (known as the Boeing B-17 today), due to the complex procedures
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required to operate the aircraft normally and forgetting a step resulting in
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lack of controls during takeoff~\cite{manifesto}
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\item It was found that because of the complicated procedure to operate the aircraft
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that the pilots would forget steps, and hence the concept of checklists was tested,
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and found to minimize human errors~\cite{manifesto}
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Checklists}
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\subsection{Checklists}
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\begin{itemize}
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% \begin{itemize}
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\item Checklists are defined by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as:
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% \item Checklists are defined by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) as:
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\blockquote{A set of written procedures/drills covering
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% \blockquote{A set of written procedures/drills covering
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the operation of the aircraft by the flight
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% the operation of the aircraft by the flight
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crew in both normal and abnormal
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% crew in both normal and abnormal
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conditions.~\ldots~The Checklist is
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% conditions.~\ldots~The Checklist is
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carried on the flight deck.}~\cite{caa:design}
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% carried on the flight deck.}~\cite{caa:design}
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\item Checklists have been shown to aid in minimizing human errors~\cite{manifesto}
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% \item Checklists have been shown to aid in minimizing human errors~\cite{manifesto}
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\item However, according to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the UK's aviation regulator:
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% \item However, according to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the UK's aviation regulator:
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\begin{itemize}
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% \begin{itemize}
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\item Checklists can be misleading and compromise the safety of the aircraft
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% \item Checklists can be misleading and compromise the safety of the aircraft
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due to them being either too confusing or taking too long to complete~\cite{nasa:design}
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% due to them being either too confusing or taking too long to complete~\cite{nasa:design}
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\item Other problems may include the crew skipping a step either unintentionally or by interruption,
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% \item Other problems may include the crew skipping a step either unintentionally or by interruption,
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or just failing to complete the checklist outright
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% or just failing to complete the checklist outright
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\item The crew may also not be alerted to performance issues within the aircraft,
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% \item The crew may also not be alerted to performance issues within the aircraft,
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that running the checklist may cause~\cite{caa:design}
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% that running the checklist may cause~\cite{caa:design}
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\end{itemize}
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% \end{itemize}
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\item However, it is important to note that checklists does not prevent the human
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% \item However, it is important to note that checklists does not prevent the human
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factor of failure to use a checklist, like in the case of Northwest Airlines
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% factor of failure to use a checklist, like in the case of Northwest Airlines
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Flight 255, where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an investigatory board
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% Flight 255, where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an investigatory board
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for aviation accidents in the United States, determined that
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% for aviation accidents in the United States, determined that
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\enquote{the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's failure
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% \enquote{the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's failure
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to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff.}~\cite{ntsb:NWA255}
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% to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff.}~\cite{ntsb:NWA255}
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\item These checklists can be bundled into a Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)
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% \item These checklists can be bundled into a Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)
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which the CAA defines it as:
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% which the CAA defines it as:
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\blockquote{A handbook containing procedures which
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% \blockquote{A handbook containing procedures which
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may need to be referred to quickly and/or
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% may need to be referred to quickly and/or
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frequently, including Emergency and
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% frequently, including Emergency and
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Abnormal procedures. The procedures
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% Abnormal procedures. The procedures
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may be abbreviated for ease of reference
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% may be abbreviated for ease of reference
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(although they must reflect the procedures
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% (although they must reflect the procedures
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contained in the AFM\footnote{
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% contained in the AFM\footnote{
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Aircraft Flight Manual - \enquote{The Aircraft Flight Manual produced by the
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% Aircraft Flight Manual - \enquote{The Aircraft Flight Manual produced by the
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manufacturer and approved by the CAA.
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% manufacturer and approved by the CAA.
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This forms the basis for parts of the
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% This forms the basis for parts of the
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Operations Manual and checklists. The
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% Operations Manual and checklists. The
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checklist procedures must reflect those
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% checklist procedures must reflect those
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detailed in the AFM.}~\cite{caa:design}
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% detailed in the AFM.}~\cite{caa:design}
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}).
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% }).
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The QRH is often
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% The QRH is often
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used as an alternative name for the
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% used as an alternative name for the
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Emergency and Abnormal Checklist.~\cite{caa:design}}
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% Emergency and Abnormal Checklist.~\cite{caa:design}}
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\item Therefore, as there may be a need for the checklist to be
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% \item Therefore, as there may be a need for the checklist to be
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referenced quickly and potentially in emergency situations,
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% referenced quickly and potentially in emergency situations,
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these checklists should be tested for flaws
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% these checklists should be tested for flaws
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\end{itemize}
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% \end{itemize}
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Checklists are defined by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA),
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the UK's aviation regulator, as:
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%
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\blockquote{A set of written procedures/drills covering
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the operation of the aircraft by the flight
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crew in both normal and abnormal
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conditions.~\ldots~The Checklist is
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carried on the flight deck.}~\cite{caa:design}
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These checklists as a result has shown to be a crucial tool in aviation
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to minimize human errors.~\cite{manifesto}
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There are multiple checklists that are designed for aircraft for the use of
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normal operation and potential problems that could arise during the flight.
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These checklists are stored in a Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) which is
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kept in the cockpit of each aircraft for use when needed. The definition
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of a QRH by CAA is:
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%
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\blockquote{A handbook containing procedures which
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may need to be referred to quickly and/or
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frequently, including Emergency and
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Abnormal procedures. The procedures
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may be abbreviated for ease of reference
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(although they must reflect the procedures
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contained in the AFM\footnote{
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Aircraft Flight Manual - \enquote{The Aircraft Flight Manual produced by the
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manufacturer and approved by the CAA.
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This forms the basis for parts of the
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Operations Manual and checklists. The
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checklist procedures must reflect those
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detailed in the AFM.}~\cite{caa:design}
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}).
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The QRH is often
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used as an alternative name for the
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Emergency and Abnormal Checklist.~\cite{caa:design}}
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However, checklists themselves can have design flaws as noted by researchers at
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the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) where checklists
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can be misleading, too confusing, or too long to complete, as a result
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having the potential of compromising the safety of the aircraft.~\cite{nasa:design}
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An example of this is what happened on Swiss Air Flight 111, where an electrical fault
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was made worse by following the checklist, resulting in the aircraft crashing in the ocean.
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This was as the flight crew was unaware of the severity of the fire caused by the
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electrical fault. Following the steps in the checklist, one of the steps was
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to cut out power to \enquote{non-essential} systems, which increased the
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amount of smoke in the cockpit.
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Simultaneously, the checklist itself was a distraction as it was found to take
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around 30 minutes to complete in testing during the investigation.~\cite{tsb:SWR111}
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This incident shows that checklists need to be tested for these flaws, and considering
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the original checklist for Swiss Air Flight 111 would have taken 30 minutes
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to theoretically complete, this could be time-consuming for checklist designers,
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and this would be something to note whilst working on this project.
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There are other potential problems with checklists,
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noted by the CAA, where the person running through the checklist could skip a step
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either unintentionally, by interruption, or just outright failing to complete the
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checklist. Or the crew may also not be alerted to performance issues within the aircraft,
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which would be a result of running the checklist.~\cite{caa:design} Therefore,
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this would be useful to add for features when testing checklists, such as
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adding the ability to intentionally skip a step of a checklist or gathering
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statistics on how the performance of the aircraft has been affected as a result
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of using the checklist.
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Another problem to note about checklists is the human factor where the crew
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may fail to use the checklist, like in the case of Northwest Airlines Flight 255,
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where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an investigatory board
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for aviation accidents in the United States, determined that
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\enquote{the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's failure
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to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff.}~\cite{ntsb:NWA255}
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This shows that even though checklists have shown to improve safety of the aircraft,
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there are other measures that aviation regulatory bodies are required implement, to avoid
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situations where the crew may completely ignore safety procedures and systems.
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%%%%% FORMAL METHODS %%%%%
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%%%%% FORMAL METHODS %%%%%
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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
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\usepackage{csquotes}
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\usepackage{csquotes}
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\usepackage{babel}
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\usepackage{babel}
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\usepackage{parskip}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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@ -22,6 +22,21 @@
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url = {https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR8805.pdf},
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url = {https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR8805.pdf},
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}
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}
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@report{tsb:SWR111,
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author = {{Transport Safety Board of Canada}},
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shortauthor = {TSB},
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number = {A98H0003},
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title = {Aviation Investigation Report
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In-Flight Fire Leading to Collision with Water
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Swissair Transport Limited
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McDonnell Douglas MD-11 HB-IWF
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Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia 5 nm SW
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2 September 1998},
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year = {2003},
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month = {02},
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url = {https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/a98h0003.pdf},
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}
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@article{nasa:checklist,
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@article{nasa:checklist,
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author = {Burian, Barbara},
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author = {Burian, Barbara},
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year = {2006},
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year = {2006},
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